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Summary findings
The  Czech  Republic's  mass-privatization  scheme  changed  They  find  no evidence  that  market  valuation  or
the governance  of many  firms  in a short  time.  Claessens,  profitability  were  lower  for firms  in which  investment
Djankov,  and  Pohl  show  that  mass privatization  was  funds  sponsored  by a firm's  main  bank  represented  a
effective  in improving  firm  management  because  of the  large  ownership  stake.  It is often  argued  that  the  firm's
concentrated  ownership  structure  that  resulted.  main  bank  having  (indirect)  ownership  control  could
For  a cross  section  of 706  firms for the  period  1992-  represent  a conflict  of interest.  The  empirical  analysis
95, they  find that  the more  concentrated  the firm's  here  shows,  quite  the contrary,  that  such indirect
ownership,  the higher  the firm's  market  valuation  and  ownership  control  has a significant  positive  influence.
profitability.  Large  ownership  through  bank-sponsored  On balance,  banks  that  had  an  (indirect)  equity  stake
investment  funds  and  strategic  investors  appears  to be  in a firm  have a positive  influence  on the firm's
particularly  important  in improving  corporate  corporate  governance.
governance  and  turning  firms around.
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from the Czech Republic
Corporate governance has received much attention in the context of the transition of
centrally-planned  economies to market economies.  The need for more effective corporate
governance of firms in these countries is obvious. How to achieve it has been more controversial.
Various schemes for privatizing state enterprises and allocating property rights have been put
forward and tried.  The Czech mass privatization program was implemented  through a voucher
scheme with a distribution of points to citizens followed by competitive bidding. It was a bold
step at changing the ownership and governance of a large part of the economy.  Within a short
period, about 70 percent of the Czech economy was in private hands.  As such, the Czech
program represents a clear test case of one approach to changing corporate governance, an
approach which has likely contributed much to the superior record of the Czech Republic in
enterprise restructuring relative to other transition economies.
At the time of initiating the program, much skepticism was voiced about mass
privatization. Particularly, while mass privatization would imply ownership by outside investors,
it could lead to diffuse ownership and poor corporate governance.  Investment funds emerged,
however, which collected much of the individuals'  vouchers, leading to more concentrated
ownership. The expectation has been that this more concentrated ownership will lead to
improved corporate governance.  To date, however, only anecdotal evidence is available on the
impact of owners on the way firms are managed. The paper also aims to shed light on cross-
countly analyses which shows that Czech firms are restructuring more rapidly than firms in other
transition economies (Pohl et al., 1996).  One aspect which differentiates the Czech model from
other countries' is in the clear ownership structure-as  a result of the mass privatization
program-and  the large influence on firms of institutional investors-as  a result of the
concenitrated  ownership and the use of other control mechanisms, including defacto  proxy voting.
To investigate this question directly and indirectly, we study whether firms which ended
up with more concentrated ownership have higher profitability and trade for higher ratios of
market to replacement value.  If more concentrated ownership leads to better corporate
governance, one would expect profitability and valuation to be increasing in ownership
concentration.  The link with profitability would be direct; the link with valuation would be
indirect since in a forward-looking market, prices will incorporate the effect of better ownership
on future firm performance. In market economies, where this is a much studied topic, these
relationships are quite strong.
This paper relates therefore various indicators of ownership concentration to the valuation
and profitability of a cross-section of firms over the period 1992-1995. For firm valuation we use
Tobin's Q, which is the ratio of the market value to the accounting (i.e., replacement) value of the
firm.  It is measured as the market value of equity plus the face value of debt relative to the book
value of net fixed assets and inventory. Controlling for some firm specific-variables,  we find that
several measures of ownership concentration are positively related to Tobin's Q and profitability.
Qs and profitability are also higher when bank-sponsored funds have large ownership. We also
find that Qs and profitability are higher when an investment fund sponsored by a firm's main bank2
is a large owner. Any  negative  effects  of conflicts  of interest-possibly due  to banks controlling
equity-appear thus to be dominated  by positive  effects,  as banks monitor  firms  closely  when they
also have (indirect)  equity  stakes.
This paper begins  with a description  of the privatization  scheme. Section  II discusses  the
link between  ownership  patterns  and profitability  and valuation;  it thus develops  the basic
hypotheses  to be tested. The ownership  patterns  resulting  from the voucher  scheme,  valuation
and profitability  are documented  in section  III while  section  IV presents  the results. Conclusions
are summarized  in section  V.
I.  The Czech Voucher  Scheme 1
The Czech mass-privatization scheme happened in two phases or "waves": the first started
in late 1991 and ended in mid-1993; the second started in January 1994 and ended in October the
same year. In total, 988 Czech enterprises participated in the first wave and 861 (of which 185
from the first wave) enterprises in the second wave.  The process followed was similar in both
waves.  First, firms were selected for privatization and managers had to submit privatization
proposals, usually to the founding ministry. Competing proposals were also possible with the
ministry of privatization approving the final proposal.  As part of the preparation, firms were
corporatized and the book value of equity was determined. The number of shares for sale was set
proportional to the book value of equity for all firms, i.e., the book value of equity per share was
identical  for all firms. Only  limited  restructuring  happened  prior to privatization.  The
privatization proposal also determined the equity share which was to remain with the state
(through the National Property Fund, NPF) in the form of temporary or permanent holdings. 2 If a
direct domestic or foreign investor had been identified who was willing to buy (part of) the firm,
then those shares would also not be offered. 3 In the first wave, only a limited number of firms
ended up with managerial or employee ownership; in the second wave, more firms did, but the
ownership stakes were still low.  All remaining shares were then offered through the voucher
scheme. All citizens 18 years and older could buy, for a nominal fee, 4 a package of vouchers
worth 1000 points.  With these points they could bid for the shares on offer or, in a pre-bidding
"zero" round, they could offer (part of) their points to investment funds, which could then bid for
shares. After the bidding rounds, point were exchanged for shares and secondary market trading
started at the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE).
1. Anderson  (1994),  Shafik  (1995),  Mejstrik  et al. (1994),  and  Coffee  (1996)  describe  the  mechanisms  of the
Czech  voucher  scheme  for  privatizing  state-owned  enterprises  in detail.  The  following  summary  is from  Claessens
(1997),  which  in turn  is largely  based  on Shafik  (1995).
2. For  all  firms,  3%  of shares  was  also  set  aside  to be used  for  future  restitution  to individuals.
3. The  fact  that  the  shares  for domestic  and  foreign  shareholders  were  determined  before  the  voucher  shares  could
imply  some  selection  bias, as good  firms may  be sold partly  for cash, with relatively  worse  firms to be completely
voucherized.  Since  we study  the cross-section  of voucherized  firms,  this should not affect  our results.
4.  In both  waves,  equivalent  to about $35 (or about  20-25%  of the average  monthly  wage at the time).3
A large number of investment privatization funds (IPFs) emerged on a voluntary basis;
specifically,  over 430 funds were established for the first wave and an additional 120 were
established for the second wave.  Although funds were started by various sponsors (domestic and
foreign banks, corporations and individuals), most funds were sponsored by domestic banks, with
several banks starting more than one fund.  Sponsoring a fund involved the establishment of a
management company which in turn organized the fund and continued to have a management
contract with the fund (Figure 1 depicts the structure).  In the first wave, the funds themselves
were al:l  established as joint stock companies, with the original voucherholders as shareholders of
the fund and the fund's assets its equity stakes in the various firms.  In the second wave, some
funds were also established as (open-end or closed-end) trusts.  As a result of active marketing
campaigns by investment funds in both waves, many individuals offered all or most of their points
to the funds.  In the first wave funds ended up with 72% and in the second wave with 64%.
Bank-sponsored funds acquired most of the points with the ten largest bank-sponsored funds
holding 67 % of all points acquired by all funds (or about 44 % of all points initially bought by








The authorities designed the privatization scheme to make the most use of information
available among participants and to allow for the greatest price discovery. General information
was made available  by the state prior to the start of the auction process on each firm covering
such items as business activity, number of employees, output and profit in preceding years, and
prior allocation of shares. Investment companies and banks played a major role in analyzing firms'
prospects on the basis of this and other information. To improve price discovery, the scheme did
not involve a single auction, but rather five sequential bidding rounds with limits on the actual sale4
of each firm in each round.5 The aim of the sequential bidding rounds was to reflect in the final
prices the information gathering and analysis by individuals and institutions as well as any private
and inside information. At the same time, the restrictions on sales limited the effects of inside
information on final ownership.
II.  Relationships between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance and Firm
Valuation
The influence of the distribution of and changes in ownership on corporate governance
and firm performance and valuation has been much studied in market economies (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997, survey the literature).  A common implication of many models of corporate
governance is that firms with more concentrated ownership structures, but otherwise identical,
have higher profitability and are valued higher as there is a greater incentive on the part of owners
to monitor the firm and make the necessary changes in management. One way to test this
implication is to study actual firm performance, changes in its management, and other measures,
and relate this to (changes in) ownership. For market-economies, this approach has been used by,
among others, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Megginson et al. (1994), Denis and Denis (1995), and
L6pez-de-Silanes (1996).  A complementary approach is to use the valuation of a firm by the
market.  In a forward-looking market, prices of firms can be expected to incorporate the effects of
ownership and corporate governance on future performance. This approach has also been used in
market economies. Levy (1983), Lease et al. (1984), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), for
example, find positive relationships between stock prices and voting power for U.S. firms.
Zingales (1994 and 1995) studies the relationship between the premium attributed to voting rights
and ownership structures for firms at the Milan stock exchange and in the U.S..  Morck, Shleifer
and Vishny (1988) provide evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between ownership by
managers and a firm's valuation and its profitability.  McConnell and Servaes (1990) confirm this
and provide in addition evidence of a positive relationship between institutional ownership and a
firm's valuation and its profitability. For the Czech and Slovak Republics, Claessens (1997) finds
a positive relationship  between concentrated ownership and voucher and secondary market prices.
We pursue both approaches in this paper as we consider them complementary. Using
performance and other accounting data alone to test effect of changes in corporate governance is
difficult  in formerly centrally planned economies.  Data are of poorer quality as new accounting
standards are introduced.  Furthermore, since the demise of central planning, relative prices have
5.  For  the  first round,  prices  (points  per share)  were  set identically  for  all firms. If demand  matched  the  supply  of
shares  of  particular  firm  at that  price,  all shares  of  that  firm  were  sold  in that round.  If a firm's  shares  were
undersubscribed,  those  that  bid received  shares  at that  price  and  the  remaining  shares  were  offered  in the next
round.  When  there  was  modest  excess  demand  (less  than  25%  excess  supply),  citizens  were  given  priority  over
investment  funds  and the  demand  of  investment  funds  was  scaled  down  to clear  the market.  With  more  than  25%
excess  demand,  however,  no shares  were  sold  and  all shares  were  to offered  again  in the  next  round  at a new  price
which  was  set  at (approximately)  the  previous  price  times  the  ratio  of demand  to supply.  In some  individual  cases,
prices  were  adjusted  differently  by  the  authorities  (see  Shafik  1995  for  further  details  and  some  examples).5
changed dramatically and past performance measures can be poor guides to future performance.
Nevertheless, firms in the Czech Republic do report quite complete information and accounting
data on profitability have improved considerably since the onset of the transition.  Especially in
the last year of our sample, profitability can be expected to reflect some of the effects of
ownership structures on corporate governance.  Stock market data also have some weaknesses.
While the stock market is reasonably active in the Czech Republic and the firms selected for this
paper are the most liquidly traded, liquidity is clearly lower than in market-economies.
Furthermore, there is much block-trading off-the-exchange, often at prices different from those on
the exchange. The prices at the exchange may then be more a reflection of the valuation of firms
by minority shareholders, and not necessarily incorporate the value of control.  While both
profitability and market valuation of firms can be expected to reflect the influence of ownership
patterns, each will have some advantages and disadvantages.
For testing these relationships, we follow the approaches of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1988, MSV from now on) and McConnell and Servaes (1990, MS from now on).  MSV and MS
investigate, for samples of 371 and about 1000 US firms respectively, the cross-sectional
relationship between ownership (by management and institutional investors) and Tobin's Q and
profitability. Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm-value  of equity, i.e.,
number of shares times the secondary market price, plus the market value of its debt-to  the
replacement value of the net fixed assets of the firm; profitability is defined as the ratio of the
inflation corrected deprecation cash-flow to the replacement value of fixed assets.  The higher the
Tobin's Q, the more valuable the firm is considered as a going concern and the more value the
market thus attributes to the ability of management to generate profits from its assets.  The link
between the level of profitability and the quality of corporate governance is obvious.  It is likely to
be very imprecise, however: many other factors can affect a given year's profitability, and there
can be considerable lags between changes in corporate governance and changes in profitability.
We would thus expect the relationship between ownership structure and Tobin's Q to be stronger
than that between ownership structure and profitability.  MSV and MS concentrate on
ownership by management and institutional investors. We broaden the ownership (concentration)
focus by also using the measures introduced by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) in their study of links
between ownership structures and profitability. As control variables, MSV and MS use leverage
(ratio of long-term debt to assets), R&D expenditures (as a ratio to assets), advertising
expenditures (as a ratio to assets), and industry dummies.
Higher valuation and profitability, however, may not only be due to greater ownership
concentration, but also to signaling and special abilities of certain owners.  Some investors may be
more able to evaluate firms-based  on their better information-and  their ownership may serve as
a signal to other investors and thus be associated with higher profitability and higher valuation.
This effect is less likely prevalent in the Czech Republic as the auction rules limited any investors
with better (inside) knowledge from establishing large ownership. And, as in other countries, any
excessive bidding by investors with inside knowledge in the secondary market would presumably
lead to higher prices, but not necessarily to ownership by the investor with inside knowledge.
While (inside) information may thus have been revealed-through  the bidding process or in the
secondary market-it  is not necessarily associated with ownership by particular investors.  Some6
investors may also be better owners as they may have access to technology or know-how (as
could be the case for foreign investors) or they may have special monitoring skills (as often
argued in the case of banks), which may raise the firm's valuation or profitability.  To allow for
these possibilities, in addition to ownership concentration variables, we include information on
the ownership by certain classes of investors in the regressions.
Some ownership structures may have costs, however, particularly when conflicts of
interest arise. In the case of state ownership, conflicts can arise if the state in addition to
maximizing share prices has other interests, such as preserving  jobs.  There is evidence that state-
owned firms are less efficient than privately-owned firms (see Megginson et al, 1994). Particularly
in the early period of transition to market economy, the state is more likely to delay firm
restructuring (e.g., to maintain employment, to assure some critical inputs, etc.), negatively
affecting firm performance and valuation.  In the case of foreign ownership costs could arise as
off-market transfer pricing between the subsidiary and its foreign owners allows the dilution of the
claims of minority owners and lower profitability. Large owners in general have opportunities to
expropriate value, as minority shareholders are not well protected given the weak court system in
the Czech Republic.
For investment funds in the Czech Republic, conflicts of interest are a very likely
possibility  (see also Coffee (1996)).  As noted, many funds are sponsored by commercial banks,
which themselves are large creditors of the firms in which the funds hold equity stakes (see Figure
1). While many of the funds are joint stock companies, and thus formally governed by the boards
elected at the annual meeting of shareholders, in practice banks exert most control.  A bank-
sponsored fund may have the interests of the bank as a creditor in mind when deciding in which
company to invest and how to value firms. There can also be a direct dilution of other equity
holders by the fund for the benefit of the bank, for example, through higher lending spreads. 6
Offsetting these effects can be the better monitoring of the firm and its management by a
bank when it has (indirectly) an equity stake.  This is because the bank has access to more
information and better incentives  to monitor firms (a combination of ownership and debt claims
can reduce the shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts, see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Both can
result in higher market valuation and higher profitability as the firm is more likely to restructure
with better corporate governance and as it may gain more easily access to bank financing, which
indirectly can also lead to more restructuring.  Because the conflicts of interest and improved
monitoring effects go in opposite direction, the net effect of bank-sponsored fund ownership on
the valuation of the firms and its profitability is a priori unclear. Possibly, the conflict of interest
could affect the market valuation more, since the market valuation is that of the minority
shareholders, while the improved monitoring may show up more in the operating profitability of a
6. In the  context  of  developing  countries  and  transition  economnies,  (indirect)  ownership  of firrns  by  banks  and
reverse  ownership  of banks  by firnns  typically  raises  concerns  about the safety  and soundness  of the financial
system  as these  cross-ownership  may lead to inside (and  unsound)  lending. This aspect  is not explicitly  addressed
here,  but the evidence  found  for a positive  role of banks in corporate  governance  of firms is of course  relevant.7
firm, since that is not directly affected by the dilution of minority shareholders' rights through, for
example, higher lending spreads.
The situation in the Czech Republic is similar to that in Germany where commercial banks,
through proxy votes, effectively control large equity stakes in firms and in general have a large
influence on firms. It has often been argued that German banks' interests may conflict with those
of other equity holders, especially those whose shares are voted by the banks in proxy.  This has
been researched by several authors.  Cable (1985) concludes that there is a positive impact of
bank ownership and involvement on firms' performance in Germany.  Edwards and Fisher (1994)
discuss Cable's results and conclude that it is concentrated ownership, rather than any special
relationships between banks and firms, which leads to improved performance. In their study of
the performance of a sample of large German firms in 1975 and 1985, Gorton and Schmid (1996)
reach a conclusion closer to that of Cable. They do not find evidence that there were conflicts of
interest in either year.  They find for 1975 that banks are special: they affect firm performance in a
way which cannot be attributed to their role as blockholders. For 1985, they find no significant
effects of banks on performance, but blockholders did affect performance significantly. To
investigate the possibility of conflicts of interest in the Czech Republic, we separately analyze the
effect of ownership by an investment fund sponsored by a firm's main bank, controlling for the
relative size of the fund ownership.
m.  Data: Resulting Ownership and Prices
We have data on Czech firms compiled from the Aspekt Stock Market Database.  The
database contains financial and ownership information of 1191 firms listed on the Prague Stock
Exchange (PSE).  It is compiled on the basis of a questionnaire sent to firms by Aspekt a.s..
Starting from the first year of the survey (1992) the financial variables were defined using
international accounting standards.  Thus the switch to international accounting standards in only
1994 in the reporting of firms to the National Statistical Office does not affect our data-series.  A
number of firms do not report PSE-prices since their shares are not actively traded.  The Aspekt
database defines such firms as firms whose shares trade less than four times in any given year.  We
exclude such firms from our analysis. The 1992-95 data are complete for 371 firms which went
through the first wave of voucher privatization. An additional set of 355 firms which went
through the second wave report consistently after 1993, making altogether for 706 firms  in the
period 1993-1995.
Summary statistics on the ownership structure of the firms are presented in Table 1, Panel
A.  Six investor classes are distinguished: the state,'  individuals,  bank and non-bank sponsored
IPFs, dlomestic  direct and foreign direct investors.  The ownership stakes of the major bank
sponsored funds are listed separately in Table Al.  Several banks have sponsored more than one
7.  Shares held  by the National  Property  Fund (through  permanent,  temporary  and restitution  shareholdings),
shares  to be sold through  banks, and shares  not sold.8
investment fund making it possible to exceed the 20% individual  fund ownership threshold.
Altogether, 263 non-bank sponsored funds are listed at least once as owners in our data. The
largest include Harvard Capital & Consulting, Privni Cesky Fond, YSE, Prosperita, as well as two
funds that became active during the second wave-Finop  (founded by the Chemapol holding
company in 1994), and Expandia (an insurance company). The concentration among investment
funds is quite high.  The top five investment funds, for example, owned on average  48.8 % (40.7
%) of a first (second) wave firm at the end of 1995, only slightly less than the average fraction
owned by all funds combined, with bank-sponsored funds owning 21.2 % (9.8 %) and non-bank
sponsored funds 27.6 % (30.9%).  While right after the mass privatization program the National
Property Fund (NPF) held shares in approximately a quarter of all firms in our sample, by the end
of 1995 most shares were transferred to other investors with the state maintaining shares in only
several dozens utility and service companies. In particular, at the end of 1995 the National
Property Fund had ownership stakes in excess of 10% in 23 energy firms, 8 oil refineries, 7 water
management firms, 4 hotels, 3 construction firms, 7 beer producers, and several individual  firms in
other industries.
The direct domestic investors' group comprises strategic investments by Czech firms,
municipalities,  as well as a small number of inside owners (managers). Only two firms report
"'employees"  in the top 5 investors.  The low averages for direct domestic and foreign investors in
Table 1, Panel A reflect the fact that only 50 firms had a direct investor at the end of 1994.  This
number, however, increased substantially  in 1995.  Across firms, ownership is quite varied. The
greatest ranges are typically for shares held by all individuals combined, followed by shares held
by all investment funds combined. The correlations between the relative ownership of the various
classes (not reported here) are all negative.
Over the five years, ownership concentration increased for the average firm, from a share
held by the top 5 investors (excluding the state) of  47.2 %  in 1991 to 59.4 % in 1995.  When
viewed from an individual  investor's (e.g., bank-sponsored fund) point of view, the average stake
in firms also increased, with the distribution becoming more skewed towards higher shares.  Table
Al  shows that this is due to portfolio realignments with the number of firms in many banks'
portfolio dropping significantly. CreditAnstalt, for example, reduced the number of firms in its
portfolio in half  Funds sponsored by Agrobanka and Ceska Pojistovna, on the other hand,
increased the number of firms they owned.  The largest increases came in the direct investors'
portfolios; virtually non-existent in 1992, by 1995 strategic investors had some stake in 40% of all
firms in our dataset.
Following the approach used by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Cable (1985), we use in
the regressions the following two measures for the degree of ownership concentration: the share
of equity held by the five most important investors combined, A5, and the Herfindahl index (the
sum of squared ownership shares), H.  Summary statistics for these measures are provided in
Table 1, Panel B.  Note that the magnitude of H almost doubles between 1992 and 1995.9
Table 1: Ownership and Firm Performance Statistics
(all in percentages)
First  Wave  Second  Wave
Category  1992  1993  1994  1995  19.93  1994  1995
A. Average Firm Ownership Share by Sponsor*
BankSponsoredlnvestmentFunds  23.1  23.8  19.8  21.2  5.8  7.8  9.8
(15.4)  (15.5)  (17.2)  (18.4)  (8.6)  (11.2)  (13.6)
Non-Bank Sponsored  Investment Funds  23.8  24.6  26.1  27.6  31.0  30.3  30.9
(14.1)  (13.9)  (17.4)  (19.5)  (14.1)  (15.4)  (16.4)
Local Strategic Investors  0.1  0.1  5.1  6.2  2.1  6.3  7.6
(0.2)  (0.2)  (11.1)  (13.3)  (8.1)  (14.9)  (17.0)
Foreign Strategic Investors  0.0  0.0  2.9  4.3  1.0  1.2  2.4
(0.0)  (0.0)  (10.6)  (13.3)  (2.6)  (6.4)  (10.2)
National Property Fund  2.4  2.1  1.2  0.9  7.6  6.7  5.4
(7.4)  (7.1)  (5.7)  (0.4)  (17.5)  (16.6)  (15.6)
Total**  49.5  50.9  53.9  60.2  46.9  45.8  55.9
(15.0)  (14.2)  (14.7)  (16.1)  (19.9)  (17.4)  (21.1)
B.  Concentration  indicators*
1992  1993  1994  1995  Panel
Share oftop 5 investors  49.5  48.9  49.6  57.8  52.1
(15.0)  (12.7)  (15.8)  (17.5)  (14.9)
Herfindahl  Index  0.076  0.085  0.109  0.134  0.106
(0.057)  (0.081)  (0.104)  (0.125)  (0.104)
C. Firm performance indicators*
1992  1993  1994  1995  Panel
Tobin's Q  96.7  80.3  78.2  76.9  81.2
(52.4)  (50.1)  (44.1)  (46.3)  (48.2)
Profitability  12.1  13.7  15.1  17.1  14.8
(11.4)  (11.6)  (11.3)  (12.6)  (11.9)
Correlation (Tobin's Q: Profitability)  15.1  23.1  26.9  27.2  21.8
*  Standard Deviation in Parentheses.
** Residual ownership is by individuals and smaller investment funds.
To calculate Tobin's Q, we use the secondary market prices for firms traded on the PSE at
the end of January following the year for which we use accounting and ownership data.  This way
we can reasonably be assured that the market has incorporated all available information. Using
these prices, we calculate Qs as the sum of market valuation and total debt outstanding, divided10
by the firm's replacement value (net fixed assets plus inventory). 8 Table 1, Panel C reports
summary statistics.  The mean Q across all five years is 0.81 which is very close to the 0.85
reported by MSV for their sample of US firms.  There is a decline in mean Q over the years as the
aggregate stock market went down after the initial surge in 1992. Agriculture is the only sector
where mean Q increased over the period (Table A2).  Typically, firms in high-skill intensive
sectors and with valuable intangible assets will have high Qs, while firms in physical capital
intensive industries and/or industries where the output prices are regulated will have low Qs.  The
sectoral dispersion of Czech firms' Qs is consistent with this: 7 of the top 10 firms (highest Qs)
are in services, while 8 of the bottom 10 (lowest Qs) firms are in utilities. 9
Profitability is defined as gross (operating) profit over net fixed assets plus inventory.
Table 1, Panel C reports summary statistics. It increases monotonically over time in all sectors
(Table A2), varying between 12 % in 1992 and 17% in 1995 on average.  7 of the top  10 firms
(highest profitability) operate in the engineering and architectural design, management, accounting
sectors; six of the bottom 10 operate in the basic metals and the fabricated metal products
(including armaments) sectors.  The correlation between Tobin's Q and profitability goes up over
time, which suggests that the market valuation becomes a better indicator of relative profitability
as accounting data start to reflect the changes in the firms' performance.
IV.  Regression Results
We run the regressions using all years and all firms in each year, i.e., as an unbalanced
panel.  F-tests reject the hypothesis of  a common constant term across firms.  The Hausman-
specification tests indicate that either the fixed or random effects model can be used.  Following
Mundlak (1978) we choose the random effects model.' 0 The pooled OLS estimates are also
reported (Table A3).  We also ran cross-section OLS regressions for every year separately to
investigate the behavior of the parameters over time (not reported).  As control variables, we use
the firm's leverage (the ratio of assets to equity) and year and sector dummies (regional dumrnmies
8. We  have  to use  the  face  value  of debt  as market  values  of  debt  are  not available. We  do  not think  this
introduces  a bias in the regressions  for three reasons. First, since  all debt  is floating interest  rate-all  fixed
interest-rate  debt  was  transferred  from  firms  to a special  agency  in 1990-par and market  values  are  close.
Second,  while (the risk of) non-payment  could  lower  market  values  below  par values,  this would  bias Tobin's  Q
downward  for low  Q-firms  as these  are more  likely  to risk repayment  problems. This would  mean that the slope-
coefficients  would  be underestimated. Third, we also tested  the relationships  between  the ratio of market  value  of
equity  to the book  value of equity  only-thus  not including  the value  of debt-and  ownership  and control  variables,
and found similar  results.
9.  The Qs of most firms are stable  over  time: nine firms are in the top ten over  the whole  period. Those  include 3
trading firms-Transacta (Q=2.54),  KOVO  (Q=2.33),  Strojimport  (Q=2.82);  two engineering  and design  firms-
Metrostov  (Q=2.43),  Plynostav  Pardubice  (Q=3  .37);  two  beer producers-Prazske Pyvovary  Staroprame  (Q=3.  13),
Plzensky  Prazdroj (Q=2.71);  one construction  firm-Vitkovicke Stavby  (Q=2.49);  one transport  firm-
Cechofracht  (Q=2.68). Six  of the bottom  ten firms are water utilities-Vodovody a Kanalizaci  Nachod  (Q=0.  10),
Zlin (Q=0.12),  Prostejov  (Q=0.14),  Kraslice  (Q=0.13),  Slovacke  (Q=0.13),  and Nymburk  (Q=0.12).
10.  From  a practical  standpoint,  the fixed  effects  model  is costly  in terms of degrees  of freedom,  and in a
longitudinal  dataset  as ours,  random  effects  have some intuitive  appeal.I1
are not significant)."' A positive sign for leverage can be expected in the Q-regression as leverage
increaLses  the value of the tax-shield advantages derived from debt financing, thus increasing the
relative value of a firm. Leverage may not, however, have a positive coefficient for the
profitability regression since we use operating income as our profitability-measure,  which is not
influenced by the tax advantages of increased interest payments. Alternatively, for both the Q-
and profitability-regression,  leverage may have a negative coefficient as, according to some
agency models, leverage can be negatively correlated with Q and profitability (see Harris and
Raviv, 1991, for a review of the relationships between leverage, and Q and profitability).
We run the regressions in three steps.  First with the Herfindahl index (or the top 5
investors) only; second with the Herfindahl index but also including the shares for the various
categories of  investors to investigate their individual roles; and finally-to  investigate the role of
banks-also  including one dummy, which is one when an investment fund sponsored by a firm's
main bank has an ownership stake of more than 10%.  The explanatory power of the regressions
is good, with R 2s between 0.14 and 0.17 for the Tobin's Q regressions and between 0.08 and
0.10 for the profitability regressions. The lower R2s for the profitability regression likely reflect
the fact that current year profit is a poor guide to future profitability and valuation.  12
Furthermore, the panel-regressions document not only the cross-section variation in the variables,
but also their variation over time.  Lower R2s could thus be expected. Annual cross-section
regressions give R2s comparable to those obtained in similar cross-section regressions. 13
Leverage has a positive and significant  coefficient for Tobin's Q. Leverage has, however,
a negative coefficient for profitability. This may be because under central planning Czech firms
financed their long-term investment needs differently  from their working capital. Their
subsequent corporatization, including the determination of the book value of equity, may have led
to a negative association between high-leverage and initial profitability. The corporatization may
have rneant, for example, that firms which received more investment loans ended up more
leveraged.  Since during the transition these high capital intensive firms were generally less
profitable, a negative association between leverage and profitability could have arisen.  The cross-
section regression using 1995 data alone suggests that this may be the explanation as the
coefficient for leverage in the profitability regression turns positive.
The result for the concentration variable is that the lower the dispersion of ownership (the
higher H), the higher Tobin's Q and profitability (Table 2, regression i).  Ownership by the top five
investors, A5, has similarly  a significantly  positive influence on Tobin's Q and profitability (not
11.  We  tested  the  joint  significance  of sectors  and  year  dummies  in all regressions.  The  sector  dummies  are  always
jointly  significant  at the 99%  level. The  year  dummies  are  jointly  significant  at the 99%  level  for all  profitability
regressions;  they  are  jointly  significant  for  Tobin's  Q  in Regression  (i) at the 95%  level,  but  turn insignificant  in
Regressions  (ii)  and (iii).
12.  As  noted,  the  correlation  between  Tobins  Q and  profitability  goes  up over  time. In the  year-by-year
regressions,  the R2s then also increase  for the profitability  regression.
13.  For example,  the R2s for the 1995-regressions  (i) for Tobin's  Q and profitability  are respectively  0.335  and
0.228,  comparable  to those obtained  by MSV,  0.595 and 0.429 given  the poorer  quality  of data and weaker
institutional  setup in the Czech  Republic  compared  to the U.  S..12
reported).  In the year-by-year regressions (not reported), the significance of the ownership
concentration variables actually increases over time, suggesting an improvement in the role of
owners in corporate governance.  In general, these results are strong and show that more
concentrated ownership has a positive and increasing association with firm value and profitability.
Table 2: Estimation Results*
(random effects model)
Explanatory Variable  Regression  i  Regression  ii  Regression  al
Tobin's Q  Profit  Tobin's Q  Profit  Tobin's Q  Profit
Leverage  0.076  -0.002  0.072  -0.002  0.073  -0.002
(16.077)**  (1.702)***  (15.677)**  (1.262)  (15.745)**  (1.284)
Dummy for First Wave  0.112  0.018  0.321  0.025  0.362  0.018
(3.521)**  (0.225)  (0.822)  (0.218)  (0.925)  (0.178)
Concentration (Herfindahl Index)  0.062  0.104  0.064  0.028  0.108  0.002
(1.691)***  (4.889)**  (0.817)  (0.729)  (0.732)  (0.741)
Bank Sponsored  IPFs  0.196  0.006  0.157  0.009
(2.425)**  (0.186)  (1.906)***  (0.358)
Non-Bank Sponsored  IPFs  -0.006  0.028  -0.007  0.023
(0.065)  (0.975)  (0.086)  (0.985)
National Property Fund  0.181  0.006  0.176  0,005
(1.492)  (0.155)  (1.512)  (0.148)
Local Strategic Investors  -0.095  0.056  -0.104  0.057
(0.872)  (1.835)***  (0.915)  (1.854)***
Foreign Strategic Investors  -0.092  0.058  -0.105  0.062
(0.714)  (1.565)  (0.784)  (1.584)
Conflict-of-interest  Dununy  0.057  0.002
(2.085)**  (0.721)
Sector Dununies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year Dunmnies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
R-square  0.139  0.083  0.167  0.098  0.169  0.098
*  All regressions  are based on an unbalanced  panel  of 2490 observations.  t-statistics  in parentheses.
**  Significant at the 99% level.
***  Significant at the 90% level.
We next investigate the role of different types of shareholders by running regressions
where we include the equity share for bank sponsored investment funds, non-bank sponsored
investment funds, the NPF, local and foreign strategic investors.  We also include the Herfindahl13
index t;o separate the effects of different owners from the effect of ownership concentration (Table
2, regression  ii). 14
The coefficients for H is now no longer significant  for either the Tobin's Q or the
profitability regression.  There is evidence that there is value to having large individual ownership
as the coefficients are positive for local strategic ownership (significant) and foreign strategic
ownership (marginally  insignificant)  for the profitability regression.  The fact that the coefficients
for strategic ownership are not significant  in the Tobin's Q regressions may be because shares of
firms with (large) strategic ownership are not very liquidly traded.  Most importantly, the
coefficient for bank-sponsored investment funds' ownership is positive and significant  for the
Tobin's Q regression.  Since we include the aggregate stake of all (bank-sponsored) funds, we
implicitly  allow for the possibility of collusion among funds in affecting the corporate governance
of firm.s.
We also ran regressions where we included the ownership of the 12 most important bank-
and non-bank sponsored funds separately (not reported).  Many coefficients for the individual
bank-sponsored funds were significantly  positive (Komercni Banka, Ceska Sporitelna,
Zivnostenska Banka) and only one significantly  negative (Agrobanka, a bank which has recently
run into liquidity problems), again suggesting a generally positive influence of bank-sponsored
investrnent funds.  Some of the non-bank sponsored funds also had positive coefficients, for
example, YSE, but in total more bank-sponsored funds had significant  coefficients. There is thus
no evidence for value-diversion by bank-sponsored investment funds; quite the opposite, the
market, i.e., the minority shareholders, appears to value their ownership, possibly because of the
monitoring and signaling roles of bank involvement. 15
Next we test for the importance of the monitoring versus conflicts of interest hypotheses
for bank-sponsored funds. Preferably, this would involve using data on the debts of each firm to
each bank and data on the equity stake of a fund sponsored by the same bank in the same firm.
We do not have such data, but we do know which was the main bank for each firm. We also
know wvhich  funds were sponsored by banks.  Since the likelihood and magnitude of conflicts of
interest depends upon the ownership stake in each firm, we create a dummy which is one when an
investnment  fund sponsored by a firm's main bank has an ownership stake of more than 10% (and
zero otherwise). 16 To control for the possible special value of bank-sponsored fund and other
ownership, we continue to include the equity share for bank-sponsored funds, non-bank
14.  The Herfindahl  index is significantly  (positively)  correlated  only  with the state ownership  share. Thus
collinearity  between  the Herfindahl  index and the ownership  shares  is probably  only  affecting  the coefficients  for
the state share.
15.  One additional  explanation  for the positive  coefficient  is that the bank-sponsored  investment  funds  really act as
inside  owners,  which,  given the many cross-linkages  between  banks and firms in the Czech  Republic,  both  through
ownership  and employment,  is not unlikely. As shown  in a theoretical  model  by Stulz  (1988)  and in the empirical
papers  by MSV  and MS, Tobin's  Q and profitability  can depend  in a inverse  U-shape  way on inside ownership,
with  a peak at 50% ownership. The positive  signs found  here for  bank-sponsored  investment  fund ownership  may
then also reflect  the upward  sloping  part of this curve.
16.  About 12%  of all firms fall into this category.14
sponsored funds, the NPF, local and foreign strategic investors.  We also continue to include the
Herfindahl index to control for ownership concentration effects.
Table 2, regression iii reports the results for the panel regressions. There continues to be
evidence for a signaling  value from general bank-sponsored fund ownership as the coefficient for
bank-sponsored fund ownership remains significantly  positive for the Tobin's Q regression. The
coefficient for local strategic ownership (profitability-regression)  remains also significantly
positive. We find no support for the conflicts of interest hypothesis as the coefficient for the
main-bank ownership dummy is not negative, but rather significantly  positive for the Tobin's Q
regression and insignificantly  positive for the profitability regression.  1
7 Minority shareholders
appear thus to value the role of banks.  There is therefore evidence of both signaling  value-
through bank-sponsored funds owning part of a firm-and  of a useful monitoring role by main
banks. While there may be conflicts of interest, they are not strong enough to cause ownership by
a main bank-sponsored-fund to be associated with lower Tobin's Q or profitability; quite the
opposite, the coefficients are (significantly)  positive. The year-by-year cross-section regressions
(not reported) suggest that these positive effects are increasing over time as the coefficients
increase in value and significance.  This increasing effect corroborates Claessens (1997) who
finds that, while voucher prices in the Czech and Slovak Republics were relatively lower when a
bank-sponsored fund had a relatively large equity stake, this effect was not found for the later
secondary market prices in the Czech Republic.
To further test the importance of general monitoring benefits versus conflicts of interest
costs, we also ran regressions where included a dummy  when any ownership stake was more than
20% (ratios between 15% and 30% led to similar results) as all types of blockholders can
presumably monitor firms (not reported).  This general blockholder dummy  is highly correlated
with the Herfindahl index-but  not with the main-bank ownership dummy-and  is in general not
significant  in either the valuation or profitability regression.  Including it, however, does not
affect the significantly  positive coefficient for the main-bank ownership dummy in the valuation
regression and the insignificantly  positive coefficient in the profitability regression.  The role of
banks in corporate governance appears thus to be special, as other blockholders do not have these
positive effects.
17.  The  insignificance  of  the  main-bank  dummy  in the  profitability  regression  and its significance  in the  valuation
regression  could  suggest  that  there  is some  dilution  of  earnings  through  main-bank  sponsored  fund  ownership,  but
that  the market  nevertheless  values  bank  involvement.  In the  OLS  regressions  (Table  A3),  however,  the
coefficients  for  the  main-bank  dummy  are significant  for  both  Tobin's  Q and  profitability  (at  the  90%  level  in the
profitability  regression).  And  for  the 1995  only  cross-section  regressions  (not  reported),  both  bank-sponsored  fund
ownership  and  main-bank  dummy  are  significantly  positive  for Tobin's  Q and  profitability  (at  the 90%  level  in case
of  the profitability  regression).  This suggest  that  indirect  bank  ownership  is not only  valued  by  the market,  but
also  leads  to improved  firm  performance.15
V.  Conclusions
The Czech voucher scheme led to relatively concentrated ownership. Of the shares
offered through the voucher scheme, two-thirds ended up with investment funds and one-third
with private individuals. Analysis of market valuation and profitability across firms provides
strong evidence that more concentrated ownership is associated with higher valuation and
profitability. Ownership by bank-sponsored funds and strategic investors is associated with even
higher valuation and profitability and thus appears to be especially  useful to improve the way firms
are managed. We do not find evidence that valuation or profitability was lower for firms in which
investment funds sponsored by a firm's main bank have a large ownership stake; at the opposite,
this variable was significantly  positive in the market valuation regressions, an effect not found for
other blockholders. This suggests that banks, while potentially facing some conflicts of interest,
on balance provide a positive and special role in corporate governance because of their
monitoring finction.16
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Table Al:  Mean Share (Number of Firms)
Owned by Individual Investors*
First Wave  Second  Wave
Category  1992  1993  1994  1995  1993  1994  1995
Bank Sponsored Investment  Funds  23.7  24.2  23.9  25.7  11.5  14.7  17.1
(358)  (356)  (309)  (306)  (168)  (175)  (189)
Including:
Agrobanka  11.3  11.6  15.1  16.9  11.2  11.0  13.1
(42)  (41)  (46)  (46)  (36)  (39)  (41)
CreditAnstalt  13.3  13.4  13.1  13.2  9.3  11.6  13.4
(60)  (60)  (27)  (22)  (28)  (18)  (18)
Ceska Sporitelna  15.2  15.2  15.9  16.1  6.1  9.9  10.9
(231)  (230)  (137)  (138)  (44)  (38)  (44)
Investicni Banka  7.8  8.3  9.2  10.5  7.4  10.3  11.7
(147)  (147)  (120)  (131)  (50)  (58)  (61)
Komercni  Banka  11.1  11.1  13.8  15.7  9.4  9.3  10.8
(121)  (121)  (103)  (103)  (24)  (30)  (30)
ZivnostenskaBanka  10.2  10.6  11.0  11.5  9.1  10.5  9.9
(49)  (50)  (33)  (31)  (16)  (15)  (19)
CeskaPojistovna  4.2  5.6  8.9  9.1  8.5  10.8  13.2
(116)  (119)  (104)  (102)  (24)  (39)  (46)
Other Banks  11.1  11.4  10.9  11.4  16.2  11.6  10.9
(26)  (26)  (30)  (29)  (10)  (10)  (13)
Non-Bank Sponsored  Investment  Funds  24.5  25.2  27.3  28.9  31.0  30.2  31.0
(361)  (362)  (353)  (354)  (335)  (335)  (334)
Local Strategic Investors  33.8  35.3  17.7  20.7  17.8  24.9  29.9
(3)  (4)  (109)  (111)  (38)  (85)  (85)
Foreign Strategic Investors  0.0  0.0  26.2  29.5  25.3  26.9  34.7
(0)  (0)  (42)  (54)  (8)  (13)  (23)
NationalPropertyFund  16.8  17.0  17.1  16.8  34.4  35.3  42.2
(52)  (45)  (26)  (19)  (74)  (64)  (43)
*  These  are the average  shares  when  ownership  is positive. It excludes  the cases  where  funds do not have any
ownership  in particular  firms.19
Table A2: Breakdown by Sector
Sector Name  SIC 2 digit code  Number of Fims  Mean Q (St. dev.)  Mean Profit (St. dev.)
1992  1993-95  1992  1993  1994  1995  1992  1993  1994  1995
Agribusiness  01,02,03,07  19  55  0.67  0.65  0.70  0.72  0.09  0.08  0.11  0.14
(0.24)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.10)
WoodProducts&Fumiture  08,24,25,26,27  14  62  0.83  0.61  0.65  0.60  0.12  0.19  0.17  0.21
(0.22)  (0.27)  (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.14)
Transport  09, 16, 19, 41, 45, 47, 48,  36  111  1.08  0.84  0.85  0.89  0.13  0.14  0.17  0.19
49  (0.74)  (0.43)  (0.45)  (0.61)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.13)
Mining  12, 14  1  11  1.23  0.66  0.71  0.58  0.21  0.17  0.20  0.23
(0.00)  (0.23)  (0.36)  (0.23)  (0.00)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.18)
Construction  15, 17  40  53  0.89  0.80  0.80  0.76  0.10  0.13  0.12  0.14
(0.47)  (0.51)  (0.52)  (0.79)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.09)
Food  20  32  54  1.27  1.09  0.95  0.92  0.12  0.14  0.17  0.13
(0.59)  (0.56)  (0.71)  (0.47)  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.10)  (0.11)
Apparel  22, 23, 31  22  45  0.88  0.73  0.73  0.61  0.13  0.14  0.15  0.14
(0.71)  (0.37)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)
Chemicals  28,29,30  13  30  1.16  0.91  0.93  0.94  0.18  0.17  0.19  0.20
(0.52)  (0.50)  (0.38)  (0.44)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.09)
Metals  32,33,34  39  58  1.19  0.98  0.82  0.85  0.14  0.16  0.16  0.19
(0.52)  (0.52)  (0.40)  (0.48)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.13)
Machinery&Equipment  35,36,37,38,39  66  104  0.85  0.74  0.72  0.71  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.13
(0.54)  (0.34)  (0.32)  (0.36)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.08)
Services  50andabove  81  113  0.88  0.77  0.73  0.73  0.11  0.14  0.15  0.18
(excluding67,73,95)  (0.54)  (0.79)  (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.16)
Finance&Investment  67,73,95  8  9  1.09  1.13  0.98  1.03  0.21  0.21  0.24  0.24
(0.62)  (0.69)  (0.66)  (0.79)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.21)  (0.20)20
Table A3: Estimation Results*
(OLS model)
Explanatory Variable  Regression  i  Regression  ii  Regression  iii
Tobin's Q  Profit  Tobin's Q  Profit  Tobin's Q  Profit
Leverage  0.061  -0.005  0.059  -0.005  0.059  -0.005
(13.462)**  (4.618)**  (13.402)**  (4.457)**  (13.432)**  (4.459)**
Dummy for First Wave  0.120  0.003  0.053  0.006  0.051  0.008
(6.178)**  (0.306)  (2.415)**  (1.251)  (2.285)**  (1.192)
Conceutration  (Herfindahl Index)  0.217  0.014  0.041  -0.061  0.011  -0.095
(2.185)**  (0.648)  (0.116)  (1.937)**  (0.142)  (1.952)**
Bank Sponsored  IPFs  0.398  0.028  0.303  0.018
(4.415)**  (1.415)  (3.305)**  (0.415)
Non-Bank Sponsored  IPFs  0.068  0.011  0.068  0.011
(0.679)  (0.452)  (0.705)  (0.468)
National Property Fund  0.311  0.024  0.312  0.022
(1.891)***  (0.742)  (1.598)  (0.741)
Local Strategic Investors  -0.215  0.059  -0.215  0.053
(1.574)  (1.639)  (1.568)  (1.642)***
Foreign Strategic Investors  -0.048  0.118  -0.033  0.122
(0.289)  (2.807)**  (0.204)  (2.845)**
Conflict-of-interest  Dummy  0.123  0.0138
(4.065)**  (1.686)***
Sector I)ummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year Durnmies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
R-square  0.182  0.079  0.209  0.103  0.216  0.104
*  All regressions are based on an unbalanced panel of 2490 observations.  t-statistics in parentheses.
**  Significant at the 99% level.
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